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Abstract
Human decision-making differs due to variation in both incentives and available information.
This constitutes a substantial challenge for the evaluation of whether and how machine learning
predictions can improve decision outcomes. We propose a framework that incorporates machine
learning on large-scale data into a choice model featuring heterogeneity in decision maker payoff
functions and predictive skill. We apply this framework to the major health policy problem
of improving the efficiency in antibiotic prescribing in primary care, one of the leading causes
of antibiotic resistance. Our analysis reveals large variation in physicians’ skill to diagnose
bacterial infections and in how physicians trade off the externality inherent in antibiotic use
against its curative benefit. Counterfactual policy simulations show that the combination of
machine learning predictions with physician diagnostic skill results in a 25.4 percent reduction
in prescribing and achieves the largest welfare gains compared to alternative policies for both
estimated physician as well as conservative social planner preference weights on the antibiotic
resistance externality.
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Machine learning methods and the increasing availability of high-quality, large-scale data provide
new opportunities to design welfare improving policies for a broad set of problems with prediction
at their core (Kleinberg et al. 2015; Agrawal, Gans, and Goldfarb 2018; Athey 2018). Prominent
examples include bail decisions in criminal justice, hiring, detecting social service fraud, health-
care provision, and labor market assistance programs. In numerous situations, machine learning
can provide a standardized, data-based risk assessment. Yet, evaluating the potential of machine
learning predictions relative to the status quo is complicated by the fact that human decisions are
outcomes of individual incentives and prediction technologies. Importantly, observed heterogeneity
in decisions can be a result of variation in both (Chan, Gentzkow, and Yu 2019). In addition, in
settings studied so far, the outcome of interest is difficult to observe and often sampled selectively
as a result of human decisions.1 These empirical challenges make it difficult to learn about whether
and by which mechanisms policies using machine learning predictions can improve outcomes.
In this paper, we consider a prime example of a policy challenge where prediction is key, the
emerging health crisis due to increasing antibiotic resistance. Antibiotic use is considered the main
driver of antibiotic resistance and inefficient prescribing can be decreased by accurate diagnosis of
bacterial vs. other causes of infections (WHO 2014).2 Specifically, we study antibiotic treatment
decisions for urinary tract infections (UTI) in primary care, combining rich, administrative data
on individual patients with diagnostic outcomes from gold standard microbiological laboratory test
results in Denmark.3 These test outcomes are observed by physicians but with a delay of several
days, often corresponding to a complete course of antibiotic treatment. Due to the acute nature of
1For example, in health settings such as the diagnosis of heart attacks considered in Mullainathan and Obermeyer
(2019), a patient is defined as recovered when no subsequent return to the hospital is observed. In Kleinberg et al.
(2018), the machine learning algorithm can only be trained on observed recidivism by defendants to whom judges
decided to grant bail, the very decision to which machine learning predictions are being compared.
2Antibiotics are used to treat bacterial infections by killing or inhibiting growth of bacteria in the body. Their
effectiveness is decreasing due to antibiotic resistant bacteria threatening to render simple infections, such as pneu-
monia or infections in wounds, a fatal risk. In the US alone, antibiotic-resistant infections result in an estimated
23,000 deaths, $20 billion in direct healthcare costs, and $35 billion in lost productivity each year (CDC 2013).
3UTI are one of the most common classes of bacterial infections. Foxman (2002) reports almost half of all women
contract a UTI once in their lifetime. In the US, yearly UTI-related healthcare costs including workplace absences
are estimated at $3.5 billion (Flores-Mireles et al. 2015), with 10 percent of all women receiving antibiotic treatment
for UTI (Bjerrum and Lindæk 2015). Primary care accounts for 90 percent of prescriptions in Europe and for 75
percent of prescriptions in Denmark (Llor and Bjerrum 2014; Danish Ministry of Health 2017).
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UTI, physicians must make a treatment decision before test results arrive. Therefore, we observe
outcomes independently of the human decision of interest, a feature which we exploit to study the
mechanisms leading to antibiotic prescription decisions. The example we consider here is important
because delayed diagnostic results with simultaneous urgency to treat are a common challenge in
health care; for example, in biopsies for malignant tumors or testing for tuberculosis. Understand-
ing the role of instant diagnostic information for treatment decisions is central to improving such
decisions (Cassidy and Manski 2019).
We combine machine learning predictions with a binary choice model governing physicians’ treat-
ment decisions. The model accommodates two main steps physicians take when treating patients.
First, the underlying cause of reported symptoms must be assessed. Second, given their assessment,
physicians decide whether or not to prescribe an antibiotic, the standard treatment for bacterial
infections. The risk assessment of a bacterial cause of infection in the first step depends on a physi-
cian’s diagnostic skill. We introduce machine learning predictions in the model by decomposing
physicians’ diagnostic skill in two dimensions. The first is the analysis of information encoded in
observable data amenable to machine learning methods. For example, physicians may spend time
observe some of a patient’s personal characteristics and medical history which can be informative
about the probability of having a bacterial UTI. The second dimension is the acquisition and in-
terpretation of diagnostic information in clinical practice which is not commonly available to policy
makers. For example, patients describe symptoms and their general health condition. Physicians
may also perform rapid diagnostic technologies, notably urine dipstick and microscopic analysis
(Davenport et al. 2017). While the dipstick analysis is a standard procedure, using microscopy
requires additional equipment and specific training. This separation of physicians’ diagnostic skill
by observable and unobservable diagnostic information provides a method to evaluate the impact
of combining machine learning predictions with physician-specific expertise on treatment decisions.
In addition to the diagnostic problem, antibiotic prescribing involves an important trade off.
Antibiotics are effective treatments for bacterial infections but using them causes a negative exter-
nality by promoting increased antibiotic resistance. For every treatment decision, physicians must
consider this trade-off and weigh patients’ sickness cost against the social cost of antibiotic resis-
tance. Formulating the model allows to distinguish whether diagnostic skill or preferences drive
decisions. Therefore, the combination of predictions with a model of treatment choice provides a
framework for the evaluation of policies using machine learning predictions as well as policies target-
ing preferences. Potential policies can include the provision of personalized predictions or targeting
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physicians’ payoffs, for example via behavioral nudging or using taxes.
For the identification of diagnostic skill and physician payoff functions, we follow results in Chan,
Gentzkow, and Yu (2019). They rely on an assumption of quasi-random assignment of suspected
pneumonia cases to radiologists evaluating chest X-rays because the true outcomes are only observed
for patients for whom medical treatment has not yet begun. The fact that in our setting physicians
make an antibiotic treatment decision before test results are known allows us to predict patient types
using rich observable data and to use these predictions to condition on expected test outcomes. The
crucial condition for this strategy is that expected test outcomes can be predicted without bias. We
present statistical test results that cannot reject unbiasedness of predictions for nearly all physicians.
In addition, we provide evidence that unobservable information obtained from point of care rapid
tests is unlikely to drive patient selection into laboratory testing. We show that by observing test
outcomes independently of treatment decisions, conditioning on individual predicted test outcomes
identifies physician skill and preference parameters in the structural model.
To predict diagnostic test results, we build on Ribers and Ullrich (2020) who train an extreme
gradient boosting machine learning algorithm on high-dimensional, administrative data from Den-
mark. The outcome is an indicator variable taking the value of one when bacteria are isolated
in patient urine samples submitted for microbiological laboratory testing. The covariates in the
prediction model include a rich set of patient-level information, such as gender, age, detailed em-
ployment status and type, education, income, civil status and more, past antibiotic prescriptions,
past microbiological test results, medical outpatient claims histories, hospitalization records, as well
as the same information on each individuals’ household members. Machine learning applied to these
data predicts out of sample realizations of bacterial UTI well. We document large heterogeneity in
physician decisions evaluated by true and false positive rates as well as by the degree of predictive
information of their decisions. The predictive information of physicians’ prescription decisions is
positively associated with the propensity to send test samples to the microbiological laboratory and
with the share of female physicians in a primary care clinic.
We estimate three parameters of the structural model for each primary care clinic using the
machine learning predictions of patient types. The first two measure the accuracy of diagnostic
information physicians use, while the third parameter governs the trade-off physicians solve in
making treatment decisions. The mean estimated signal noise parameter on patient-type information
is larger than signal noise on clinical diagnostic information, implying that, on average, physicians
rely more on information from in-clinic diagnostics than on observing patient types. We document
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significant heterogeneity in the estimated noise parameters. Over one-third of physicians make no
use of patient type information encoded in observable data. The mean estimated weight of the social
cost of antibiotic resistance relative to an individual patient’s sickness cost is 0.56 with a standard
deviation of the distribution across physicians of 0.13. This implies that the mean physician weighs
the social cost of increasing antibiotic resistance due to one antibiotic prescription slightly above
one half the health benefit of curing one patient.
To gain insights about potential reasons for physician heterogeneity, we correlate the parameter
estimates with primary care clinic characteristics. We find that clinics with more patients per
physician use patient type information less. The noise parameter on clinical diagnostic information
is positively correlated with mean physician age and negatively associated with the intensity of
laboratory testing, suggesting that physicians with higher skill may be younger on average and rely
more on high-quality diagnostic technologies.
We use the structural model to evaluate three counterfactual policies. The first provides physi-
cians with the machine learning prediction for each patient. Here, we hold physicians’ payoff func-
tions and clinical diagnostic information fixed. We find that this policy decreases overall prescribing
by 25.4 percent (4,146 prescriptions) and overprescribing, prescriptions to patients without bacte-
rial infections, by 44.4 percent (2,831 prescriptions). The number of treated bacterial infections
decreases by 13.2 percent (1,315 prescriptions). The second counterfactual policy changes physi-
cians’ preference parameters while holding patient type and clinical diagnostic information fixed.
We increase the payoff parameter such that the reduction in overall prescribing is equivalent to the
reduction achieved by providing predictions to physicians. This can be achieved by policies such as
nudging or an antibiotic tax shifting the weight on the antibiotic resistance externality. The policy
reduces overprescribing by 33.4 percent (2,133 prescriptions). Yet, without improving diagnostic
information this policy induces adverse effects: the number of treated bacterial infections decreases
by 20.0 percent (1,990 prescriptions), significantly more than in the first counterfactual. These re-
sults illustrate the usefulness of separating the prediction and decision step in the structural model.
The effects of interventions attempting to incentivize behavior according to social objectives can be
considered independently from interventions aimed at purely improving diagnostic information.
We also consider a third counterfactual which is not based on the structural model. It differs from
the first two policies because it ignores physician incentives and substitutes rather than complements
diagnostic skill. The policy we evaluate considers a corner case, which does not require knowledge of
physicians’ payoff functions. To achieve this, it distributes prescriptions from low-risk to high-risk
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patients, holding the number of treated bacterial infections fixed. Such a policy effectively replaces
physician decisions for risk ranges in which the machine learning predictions are most accurate.
Much of the existing work evaluating machine learning predictions for policy follows comparable
approaches (Bayati et al. 2014; Chalfin et al. 2016; Kleinberg et al. 2018; Yelin et al. 2019;
Ribers and Ullrich 2019, Hastings, Howison, and Inman 2020). This counterfactual policy reduces
prescribing by 10.0 percent (1,633 prescriptions) without treating fewer patients suffering from a
bacterial infection, and reduces overprescribing by 25.2 percent (1,607 prescriptions).
Computing gains in payoffs for the full range of preference parameters, we find the best policy
depends on a social planner’s weight on the antibiotic resistance externality. The third counterfac-
tual guarantees positive aggregate payoff gains for all weights. Yet, the counterfactuals which give
physicians full discretion and make use of their skill generate the largest payoff gains for sufficiently
high weights on the externality, at the mean estimated physician-level preference weights and above.
We contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, we identify a high-stakes policy
problem in which combining signal from a machine learning algorithm and human expertise can play
an important role for decision making. The existing literature has considered a variety of settings,
in with machine learning can deliver useful predictions. However, evaluating prediction tools in the
field is often difficult for ethical, legal, or practical reasons. Therefore, for considering the use of
machine learning in practice, it appears particularly useful to evaluate potential interventions ex
ante, taking into account the information decision makers have absent an intervention. The existing
literature has stopped short of measuring heterogenous skill and preferences driving decisions that
machine learning predictions aim to improve. Kang et al. (2013) show that online reviews can
help predict restaurants’ sanitary conditions for hygiene inspections but do not compare these
predictions to authorities’ decisions which restaurants to inspect. Andini et al. (2018) predict
household consumption responses for the targeting of a tax rebate program in Italy but consider a
decision rule based exclusively on machine learning predictions.
Several existing studies consider health care applications but without incorporating human ex-
pertise in the evaluation of machine learning predictions. Hastings, Howison, and Inman (2019)
predict the riskiness of opioid prescriptions and impose constraints on decisions based on predic-
tions. Yelin et al. (2019) predict molecule-specific antibiotic resistance probabilities, conditional on
knowing which bacteria are present, and improve prescription efficiency by redistributing molecules
while holding the distribution of prescribed molecules fixed. Ribers and Ullrich (2019) consider
policies which redistribute antibiotic prescriptions from patients with low to high predicted risk of
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having a bacterial infection. They find improvements are possible by partly overriding physicians’
decisions. Yet, in many situations physicians have diagnostic information that machine learning
predictions cannot provide.
Kleinberg et al. (2018) make an important contribution by using machine learning to evaluate
the potential improvements of judges’ bail decisions, where only crimes committed by released de-
fendants can be observed. Their framework requires the assumption that judges’ risk prediction skill
is homogenous and preferences, reflected in judge leniency, are the source of variation in decisions.
Currie and MacLeod (2017) allow for heterogeneity in skill but assume homogenous preferences to
evaluate the counterfactual of reassigning C-sections from low- to high-risk pregnancies. While they
focus on the effects of improving surgical and decision-making skill, we focus on the potential of
data-driven predictions to complement physician skill. Importantly, we allow for heterogeneity in
skill and preferences. This flexibility is crucial for combining machine learning predicted risk with
physician expertise when heterogenous preferences are likely an important driver of decision-making.
Finally, a large literature explores policies to tackle the problem of growing antibiotic resistance.
We contribute to this work by providing evidence for the potential effectiveness of prediction-based
demand side policies aimed at curbing antibiotic resistance. Urinary tract infections are the sec-
ond most common bacterial infection accounting for a bulk of human antibiotic consumption. The
literature considering policy interventions includes Laxminarayan et al. (2013) on prescription
surveillance and stewardship programs, Bennett, Hung, and Lauderdale (2015) on general practi-
tioner competition in Taiwan, Currie, Lin, and Meng (2014) and Das et al. (2016) on financial
incentives for physicians in China and India, Kwon and Jun (2015) on peer effects in Korea, and
Hallsworth et al. (2016) on communication of social norms by alerting high-prescribers of their
status in the UK. While this research has identified various ways to reduce antibiotic prescribing,
the cost in terms of potential undertreatment are often difficult to measure. Without improving
diagnostic information, many policies may lead to unintended consequences and costs. Making the
distinction between diagnostic information and preferences is pivotal for designing and evaluating
efficient policy measures. We provide a framework to make this distinction explicit.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional back-
ground and data. Section 3 shows the machine learning prediction results and Section 4 inspects
observed heterogeneity in prescription decisions. Section 5 develops the structural model of physi-
cian prescription choice when skill and preferences vary, discusses identification and estimation, and
estimation results. Section 6 presents counterfactual policy evaluations and Section 7 concludes.
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2 Danish administrative data and laboratory test results
We use Danish administrative registry data which cover a vast array of information including pa-
tient and patient household members’ detailed socioeconomic data as well as antibiotic prescription
histories, general practice insurance claims and hospitalization records. Notably, the coherent use of
unique personal identifiers enables us to merge registries as well as connect individuals to laboratory
test results acquired from two major Danish hospitals.
2.1 The Danish healthcare system
Denmark has a universal and tax financed single payer health care system with general practitioners
as the primary gatekeepers. Every person living in Denmark is allocated to a general practitioner
by a list-system within a fixed geographic radius around the home address. Patients can switch
physicians from their initial assignment at a small cost but most stick with their assigned general
practitioner. Although primary care clinics operate as privately owned businesses, all fees for
services are collectively negotiated between the national union of general practitioners and the
public health insurer. Importantly, physicians do not generate earnings by prescribing drugs to
patients who have to purchase their prescriptions from local pharmacies. In 2012, Denmark had
2,200 primary care clinics with a median size of just above one general practitioner per clinic (Møller
Pederson, Sahl Andersen, and Søndergaard 2012). Throughout the paper, we will use physician and
clinic interchangeably because most of our medical transaction data are observed at the clinic
level. General practitioners are responsible for prescribing approximately 75 percent of the human
consumed systemic antibiotics in Denmark (Danish Ministry of Health 2017).
2.2 Analysis sample based on clinical microbiological laboratory test results
Individual-level clinical microbiological laboratory test results comprise the central data set of our
analysis. Particularly, it contains the outcome we aim to predict, a binary outcome indicating
if bacteria were isolated when a urine sample was acquired from a patient consulting a general
practice physician. We acquired clinical microbiological laboratory test results from Herlev hospital
and Hvidovre hospital, the two major hospitals in Denmark’s capital region covering a catchment
area of roughly 1.7 million inhabitants, nearly one third of the Danish population, for the period of
January 2010 to December 2012. The laboratory data provides the bacterial species and relevant
antibiotic resistances when bacteria are detected in a patient sample. In addition, patient and clinic
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identifiers and information on the biological sample type, the test acquisition date, sample arrival
date at the laboratory, and test response date is provided. A total of 2,579,617 microbiological
samples are observed in the time period with submissions from both general practitioner clinics and
hospitals. Urine samples constitute 477,609 samples out of which 156,694 are submitted by general
practitioners, the focus of our application. Bacteria were isolated in approximately one out of three
urine samples, both overall and among the general practitioner submitted samples. We further
restrict the number of observations in order to focus on consultations that constitute a first contact
with a physician within the patient’s treatment spell. Hence, we exclude test observations where
the patient received a systemic antibiotic prescription or were previously tested within 28 days prior
to the sample acquisition date. Lastly, we also exclude pregnant women from our analysis as both
the test decision, including many mandatory tests during pregnancy, and the prescription decision
cannot be compared to the typical non-emergency patient.
The set of test observations used for machine learning is comprised of 74,511 test results for urine
samples taken during initial consultations with men or non-pregnant women in a non-emergency set-
ting consulting physicians in 688 primary care clinics. For this set, nearly all of the test procedures
lasted two or more days during which general practitioners must decide under uncertainty. Since
we know the precise timing of urine sample acquisitions and the test response date, we can deter-
mine exactly whether physicians’ prescribe antibiotics with or without knowledge of the test result.
By focussing on consultations during which physicians submitted a urine sample for microbiological
laboratory testing, we ensure that test outcomes are observed for all patients regardless of the physi-
cians’ prescription decisions. We so avoid the selective labels problem tackled by Kleinberg et al.
(2018), a common challenge when evaluating counterfactuals in machine learning applications, and
advance what can be learnt about the role of machine learning predicted risk for treatment decisions
conditional on laboratory testing. The drawback of this approach is a lack of generalizability of
our results to prescription occasions that did not include patient microbiological testing. However,
laboratory testing for bacterial UTI is common and indicated in clinical practice when point-of-care
diagnostics are inconclusive (Davenport et al. 2017). When a physician decides to test, the value
of diagnostic information is presumably high so that the prediction-based policies proposed here
improve upon situations in which physicians are making decisions under significant uncertainty.
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2.3 Danish national registries
The administrative data provided by Statistics Denmark covers the entire population of Denmark
between January 1, 2002, and December 31, 2012. The registries can be linked for all individuals in
our laboratory data. For each, we observe a comprehensive set of socioeconomic and demographic
variables, the complete prescription history of systemic antibiotics (Lægemiddeldatabasen), hospital-
izations (Landspatientregisteret), and general practitioner insurance claims (Sygesikringsregisteret).
The demographic data include gender, age, education, occupation, income, marriage and family
status, home municipality, immigration status and place of origin, and lastly includes household
member identifiers which allows us to identify the patients’ family members and add their demo-
graphic data as well as the laboratory data and the data from the following registries. The data
on systemic antibiotic prescriptions contain slightly more than 35 million purchased prescriptions.
We observe the date of purchase, patient and prescribing primary care clinic identifiers, anatomical
therapeutic chemical drug classification, drug name, price, indication of use, purchased package size
and defined daily dose. It should be noted that the indication of use is imprecise in the sense that
many prescriptions are given with a UTI indication but prescriptions for UTI are also given with
a more generic indication, e.g. against infection, or without indication at all. The hospitalization
data comprise all patient contacts with hospitals, including ambulatory visits. The data contain
observations on hospitalizations of more than 2 million unique individuals per year over since 2002
and includes information on hospitalization admittance and discharge dates, procedures performed,
type of hospitalization (ambulatory, emergency, etc), primary and secondary diagnoses and the
number of total bed days. Lastly, the insurance claims data cover all Danish general practitioner
clinic services provided to the Danish population of patients. The claims data are comprised of
approximately 100 million claims per year and include physician and patient identifiers, the week
of consultation, and services used. Among other, the claims data allow us to identify pregnant
women from mandatory pregnancy-associated examinations who we exclude from the analysis. The
combination of the laboratory data and the administrative registers yields a vector xit of 1,215
predictor variables for patient i at time t. The predictor variables can be grouped into categories
including patient characteristics and test timing, patient past prescriptions, patient past laboratory
test results, patient past hospitalizations, patient past general practice insurance claims, household
members’ past prescriptions, household members’ past laboratory test results, household members’
past hospitalizations, household members’ past hospitalizations, and household members’ past gen-
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eral practice insurance claims. All contained historic data relative to the test acquisition time are,
in principle, observable to the physician at the time of the consultation.
3 Machine learning predictions
We use prediction results from Ribers and Ullrich (2020) who train an extreme gradient boosting
algorithm, proposed by Friedman, Hastie, and Tibshirani (2000) and Friedman (2001), to predict
if patients suffer from bacterial UTI based on information contained in laboratory tests and a rich
set of individual patient data.4 We create 24 monthly out-of-sample evaluation partitions from
January 2011 to December 2012, and use all data prior to the respective test partition as training
data. In summarizing the prediction results and the subsequent empirical analysis, we additionally
drop clinics with fewer than 100 test observations to provide a sufficient level of statistical power.
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Figure 1: Laboratory test results relative to machine predictions of bacterial test
outcomes. Spheres represent averages over 100 tested patients sorted by predicted risk.
We illustrate the quality of the machine learning predictions m(x) of the binary outcome y,
indicating the result of a microbiological test result, in Figure 1 which plots the average test results
against the average out of sample predicted risk. Every sphere represents a bin containing 100
patients where patients are assigned to bins sorted by their predicted risk. Outcomes are close to
4We use the extreme gradient boosting algorithm implemented in xgboost for R.
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the 45 degree line throughout the risk distribution, showing that the algorithm on average correctly
predicts bacterial risk. A common measure of prediction quality for binary outcomes is the area
under the receiver operating curve (AUC) for out-of-sample observations. Our prediction function
for positive bacterial test outcomes has an AUC equal to 0.728. In comparison, Kleinberg et al.
(2018) report a comparable AUC of 0.707 in predicting defendants’ failure to appear in court in
criminal justice.
4 Heterogeneity in prescription decisions
To inspect potential heterogeneity in physician decisions, we first consider the predictive value
of physician decisions for laboratory test outcomes by including prescription choices in the set of
predictors. Figure 2 shows the clinic-specific difference in AUC between two prediction models. One
includes the physician’s treatment choice as a potential predictor and one excludes it. Including
physician choice increases the AUC on average and for most clinics. The observed heterogeneity
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Figure 2: Distribution of physician-specific changes in AUC due to treatment choice
as a predictor. Bins include at least five observations to ensure anonymity.
To learn about potential correlates with this measure, we link these results to a set of clinic
characteristics which we observe for 117 out of the total of 194 clinics. Table 5 in Appendix A shows
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the coefficients of a linear regression of the change in AUC on clinic characteristics. The number of
laboratory tests ordered per patient are positively associated with improvement in prediction due to
information contained in treatment choices. One interpretation of this observation is that physicians
with more frequent exposure to patients with urinary tract infections are better at identifying
bacterial infection causes. Being a female physician is also positively correlated with the amount of
predictive information in prescription decisions while physician age is negatively associated. While
we can give no causal interpretation to the parameters estimated in this analysis, the correlations
hint towards differences in the use of diagnostic technologies across clinics based on types of patients
as well as physician age and gender. It is important to note that the interpretation of the change
in AUC due to the treatment choice predictor as physician skill is confounded by the fact that
physician choice is the outcome of an optimization problem according to the physician’s objective
function. A physician may know the true bacterial outcome nearly perfectly for each patient but
still decide to give a prescription irrespective of beliefs. If so, the predictive information measured
here does not, without further assumptions, reflect the diagnostic information physicians hold.
Because these observations are limited in the extent to which they can inform policies, we
borrow intuition from Chan, Gentzkow, and Yu (2019) who view the diagnostic problem through
the lens of a standard binary classification problem. A common tool to study such a problem is
the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, which is the set of all trade-offs between false
positive and true positive rates a given classification technology allows. For antibiotic prescribing,
a false positive is considered an overprescription, that is a prescription to a person who did not
suffer from a bacterial infection, and a true positive is an effective prescription of an antibiotic to a
person with a bacterial infection. At one extreme of this set every patient with a bacterial infection
can be given an antibiotic, at the cost of complete overprescribing. Conversely, overprescribing can
be completely avoided at the cost of giving no antibiotics to any patients, including ones with a
bacterial infection.
The achievable trade offs between these extremes depend on a physicians’ skill to diagnose
whether an illness is caused by a bacterial infection or not. Given this skill, the position on the
associated ROC curve reflects the physician’s choice of trade off between false and true positive
rates. We can directly calculate physicians’ false and true positives rates and plot their location
in the ROC space because we observe the disease state for every tested patient irrespective of
prescription decisions. This is due to the fact that the only conclusive way to diagnose a bacterial
urinary tract infection is a microbiological analysis, which returns results only after several days.
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In the meantime, physicians must make prescription decisions under uncertainty, relying on their
diagnostic skill absent a laboratory test result. By observing physicians’ locations we can learn
about the diagnostic information available to physicians at the time of prescription decisions.
Figure 3 shows a heat map of prescription rates relative to negative and positive bacterial test
outcomes. Physician prescribing relative to bacterial outcomes varies widely. Physicians’ location
close to the origin place is suggestive of a large weight on the antibiotic resistance externality rela-
tive to individual sickness cost, hence low levels of overprescribing but also low levels of appropriate
prescribing. Physicians to the top right are more intense prescribers which suggests a low weight
on the antibiotic resistance externality relative to individual sickness cost. The plot suggests that
general practitioners in Denmark do remarkably well in avoiding prescribing to non-bacterial cases
while at the same time prescribing to a high share of bacterial infections. Yet, the significant vari-
ation both away from as well as parallel to the diagonal line suggest that policies may be able to
improve decision outcomes by enhancing diagnostic prediction as well as incentivizing physicians to
















































Figure 3: Heat map of physicians’ true and false positive rates before test results. For
anonymity, aggregated into areas of five or more physicians.
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5 A treatment choice model with variation in payoffs and skill
We propose a formal framework that combines machine learning predictions with a model of primary
care providers’ treatment choice allowing for heterogenous payoff functions and skill. The model
follows Chan, Gentzkow, and Yu (2019) by separating the individual physicians’ treatment choice
problem from the preceding step of forming predictions. Specifically, we consider physician skill
in two dimensions: diagnosis based on observable background information, as also used by the
machine learning algorithm, and diagnosis based on unobservable clinical information available
only to the physician. The distinction of these two types of diagnostic skill and the payoff function
in a model of physician prescription choice provides a systematic framework to analyze the effects
of counterfactual policies that improve diagnostic skill or manipulate physicians’ payoff functions.
Sickness realization
We model patient i’s sickness realization as determined by a latent index, νi, such that the patient
has a bacterially caused infection according to
yi = 1[νi > ν̄], (1)
where ν̄ is a common threshold across all patients. The latent patient index is normally distributed
with mean τi, the patient’s type, such that
νi ∼ N (τi, σ2ν). (2)
We do not require any assumptions on the distribution of patient types, τi, across physicians.
Instead, we recover τi from m(xi) = E{yi | xi}, that is, by assigning patient type as the machine
learning predicted risk conditional on observables xi.
Prediction
In clinical practice, when patients present symptoms of a urinary tract infection, physicians gather
information about patients’ true sickness state by observing xi, including i’s personal characteristics
and medical histories. Some physicians may research patients’ medical histories in more detail than
others so that risk assessment based on observable data depends on analytical skill. We assume
that the physician receives a noisy signal about patient i’s type, where lower noise implies higher
skill,
ξij ∼ N (τi, σ2ξj ). (3)
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In addition, physicians can acquire clinical diagnostic information by observing patients’ health
condition and performing either one or both of the rapid diagnostic technologies available today:
urine dipstick and microscopic analysis (Davenport et al. 2017). The dipstick analysis is standard
procedure but microscopic analysis requires additional equipment and specific training. Errors in
interpreting dipstick results and performing microscopic analysis may introduce substantial variation
in diagnostic skill in this setting, an observation that has been documented in medical decision
making more generally (Hoffrage et al. 2000, Pallin et al. 2014). Thus, physicians receive a noisy
signal by observing clinical diagnostic information,
ηij ∼ N (νi, σ2ηj ). (4)
Figure 6 in Appendix B illustrates the distribution of νi and the signals ξij and ηij for an example
patient and physician.
Given both patient type and clinical diagnostic signals, the physician forms her posterior beliefs,
vij , about the latent patient index according to
νij | ξij , ηij ∼ N (µij , σ2ij) (5)


























Physician j’s payoff function reflects the trade off between a patient suffering sickness cost aj from
delaying prescribing until a test result is available, and the social cost of prescribing βj associated
with a potential increase in antibiotic resistance due to antibiotic use. While the social cost is
incurred for every antibiotic prescribed, the sickness cost of waiting is only incurred by untreated
patients suffering from a bacterial infection. Antibiotic treatment is only curative and alleviates
sickness if a patient suffers from a bacterially caused infection. The payoff function at a patient’s
initial consultation can therefore be written as
π( d, y ;αj , βj) = −αjy(1− d)− βjd, (7)
where d is an indicator for the decision to prescribe an antibiotic. We assume 0 < βj < αj such
that prescribing is always optimal when an infection is known to be bacterial with certainty.
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A payoff-maximizing physician then proceeds to prescribe an antibiotic if and only if the expected








⇔ µij > v∗j (σξj , σηj , αj , βj) (8)
where







As patient types are only identified relative to their distance from the sickness threshold, v̄, in terms
of units of σν , we set v̄ = 0 and σν = 1 resulting in the final prescription rule:














g(ξij ,ηij |αj ,βj ,σξj ,σηj )
]. (10)
We assume physicians hold correct beliefs about their own skill. Low signal variance reflects high
skill. The comparative statics with respect to σξj , σηj , and βj/αj are intuitive. The larger a
physician’s weight on the antibiotic resistance externality relative to individual patients’ sickness
cost, the less likely she is to prescribe an antibiotic. The effect of the two skill parameters σξj
and σηj is ambiguous. Low skill, reflected in large parameter values, increases the last term of the
inequality and hence the probability to prescribe. On the other hand, with low skill, large signal
realizations can turn the sign of the first or second terms and lead to prescriptions for non-bacterial
cases or vice versa.
5.1 Identification
Our identification strategy follows the arguments in Chan, Gentzkow, and Yu (2019) who show that,
under the assumption of random assignment, the skill and preference parameters of their model are
identified. Their setting requires a design using random assignment because they only observe
the true outcome for a selected part of their sample. We exploit a feature which is common for
many medical diagnostic and treatment situations. Consequential treatment decisions must often
be made before complete diagnostic test results are available. In our data, the waiting period for
test results was typically at least two days and often three to five days, exceeding the duration
of an antibiotic treatment. The ex post observation of true test outcomes, regardless of physician
prescription decisions at the time of test acquisition, allows us to predict patient types using rich
observable data and to use these predictions to condition on expected test outcomes.
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Equations (2) to (6) combined with a physician’s observed patient types, m(x), determine the
shape of all potential ROC curves as a function of physician skill parameters σξj and σηj . The
ROC curves are guaranteed to be smooth and no two ROC curves can intersect. This ensures
that each physician, defined by her observed false positive and false negative rates, lies on only one
ROC curve. As the model includes two signals, ξ and η, ROC curves may not always be generated
from a unique combination of σξj and σηj . The two physician skill parameters are then separately
identified by observations for which the patient type and clinical diagnostic signal contradict and the
physician’s decision reflects which of the signals she relies on. In our application, identification of σξj
is achieved by observing treatment decisions for patients with similar type signals ξ and variation in
clinical diagnostic signals η, and identification of σηj analogously by observing treatment decisions
for patients with similar η and variation in ξ.
Having pinned down the physician’s ROC curve, the preference parameter βj is then identified
by the cutoff value in equation (9) which moves the estimated physician along the ROC curve from
the bottom left, β = 1, to the top right, β = 0. Simulating ROC curves based on estimated σξj , σηj ,
and βj , we find that in our data each physician depicted in Figure 3 lies on the ROC corresponding
to their skill and preference parameters.5
The crucial condition for this strategy is that the expected test outcome can be predicted
without bias. Bias can, for example, be introduced if physicians rely on unobservables to select
whom to test.6 We cannot test directly whether the machine learning predictions recover patient
types without bias because we only observe one single patient sickness realization. Instead, we
test whether the physician-level sum of the sickness indicator concurs with the set of patient type
predictions. If predicted patient types are true, the physician-level sum of sickness realizations
follows the Poisson-Binomial distribution, that is, the sum of non-identical independent Bernoulli
trials. Using this test, we cannot reject machine learning patient type predictions for 160 out of
194 physicians, that is 83 percent, at the five percent level. We verify that the estimation results
are robust to leaving out physicians for whom we reject that patient type predictions are true on
average at the five percent level.
5For reasons of anonymity we cannot show individual physician data points.
6Bias may in principle also be introduced by patients’ selection of which physician to consult. In Denmark,
primary care providers are assigned by an individual’s municipality of residence. Switching away from these default
assignments is possible but uncommon. Therefore, physicians treating UTI are almost completely determined by
location of residence. The data we use for prediction contain information about patients’ location of residence in
addition to the described socioeconomic and health data, allowing for the prediction algorithm to use this information.
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Figure 4 shows physician-level mean bacterial rates and mean predicted risk are both strongly
centered around the value of 0.4. The remaining variation around the center of the sphere follows the
diagonal suggesting further that risk predictions are unbiased at the physician-level. If physicians
selected patients to be tested based on unobservables that cannot be captured by a machine learning



































Figure 4: Heatmap of physician mean bacterial rate and predicted bacterial risk. Areas
with five physicians or more are plotted.
To consider the potential role of unobservable information for physicians’ decisions who to test
further, we also inspect the balance of the types of bacteria found in tests as well as their antibiotic
resistances. Different bacteria have varying difficulty of detection by in-clinic diagnostics such
as dipstick and microscopic analysis. Further, they can lead to different symptoms and disease
severities. These may be important sources of information contained in unobservables, which we
assume do not drive the decision to procure a microbiological test. Abaluck et al. (2016) show that
variation in skill should drive the bacterial rate of tests, that is test yields, and not the absolute
number of tests. In clinical practice, microbiological analysis in the laboratory is typically required
if the urine dipstick analysis is inconclusive regarding the bacterial cause of an infection (Davenport
et al. 2017). Point of care tests can give an indication for the presence of some but not all types of
bacteria. If skill varies regarding the signal physicians can observe from such point of care tests or
symptom assessment, and this affects the decision to obtain a laboratory diagnostic, this variation
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would be reflected in differing rates of different bacteria across physicians with different overall test
yield. For example, if there is variation in the ability to identify E.coli bacteria from point of care
tests, then we would see variation in the share of positive E.coli test results across physicians with
varying test yield.
Table 1 Balance of types of bacterial infection causes
Ej [y] Ej [y] ∆
E.coli 0.67 0.68 0.014
(0.08) (0.06) (0.010)
E.faecalis 0.05 0.04 -0.014
(0.04) (0.02) (0.005)
Enterococcus 0.03 0.04 0.007
(0.03) (0.03) (0.004)
K.pneumoniae 0.04 0.05 0.007
(0.03) (0.02) (0.004)
S. agalactiae 0.05 0.04 -0.009
(0.04) (0.02) (0.005)
Others 0.16 0.16 0.005
(0.05) (0.04) (0.007)
J01CA01 0.40 0.39 -0.006
(0.08) (0.06) (0.010)
J01CA04 0.02 0.02 0.004
(0.02) (0.01) (0.002)
J01CA11 0.26 0.23 -0.026
(0.07) (0.05) (0.008)
J01DC02 0.09 0.08 -0.007
(0.04) (0.04) (0.006)
J01DD13 0.03 0.03 0.002
(0.02) (0.02) (0.003)
J01EA01 0.22 0.20 -0.014
(0.07) (0.05) (0.008)
J01EB02 0.35 0.33 -0.019
(0.08) (0.06) (0.010)
J01MA02 0.10 0.09 -0.004
(0.05) (0.03) (0.006)
J01MB02 0.10 0.09 -0.003
(0.05) (0.03) (0.006)
J01XE01 0.07 0.07 0.002
(0.04) (0.04) (0.006)
Number of cases 20447 22033
Number of clinics 97 97
Notes: This table reports mean bacterial species and resistance rates
for physicians above and below the median of mean bacterial rates
Ej [y]. Physician-level means and standard deviations are weighted by
physician-level numbers of observations.
To investigate this, we split physicians into two groups, those above and below the median
clinic-level mean bacterial rate. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of physician-level shares of
bacteria species for these two groups in positive test results, where we weigh the physician-level mean
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and standard deviations by their numbers of observations. The small differences in size and the
structural similarity across bacteria suggests physicians do not systematically select which patients
to test based on informative signals from point of care tests. Likewise, physicians may vary in their
knowledge about the prevalence of antibiotic resistance for specific patients or in the population.
Such knowledge may also influence the decision to make use of laboratory diagnostics. Table 1
shows that little variation in resistance rates can be observed between physicians with low and high
test yield. The balance across nearly all bacteria and antibiotic molecules provides evidence that
information at the point of care, which is unobservable to us, is not a strong driver of the selection
of patients receiving a laboratory tested.
5.2 Estimation
We estimate the model by simulated maximum likelihood using observed data on prescription
decisions, dit, sickness realizations, yit, and patient types τi recovered from random forest predictions
m(xi). We normalize αj = 1 because only the ratio βj/αj is identified. The simulated likelihood
contribution from a single observation follows from
Lij(dij | Θj , yi,m(xi)) =
 Pr
{
g(ξij , ηij | βj , σξj , σηij ) > 0 | Θj , yi,m(xi)
}
if dij = 1
Pr
{
g(ξij , ηij | βj , σξj , σηij ) < 0, | Θj , yi,m(xi)
}
if dij = 0.
(11)
where Θ = {βj , σξj , σηj} and ξij and ηij are simulated conditional on observed yi using the distri-
butional assumptions in equations (2), (3) and (4). Appendix C explains the procedure to simulate
the probabilities in equation 11. Defining Ij as the set of patients consulting physican j, the joint
likelihood over outcomes dj = {dij}i∈Ij is given by
Lj(dj | Θj ,yj ,m(xj)) =
∏
i∈Ij
Lij(dij | Θj , yi,m(xi)). (12)
where yj = {yi}i∈Ij andm(xj) = {m(xi)}i∈Ij . Physician skill and preferences can now be recovered
for physician j from




logLij(dij | Θj , yi,m(xi)). (13)
Estimating Θ̂j for every physician allows us to recover the nonparametric physician heterogeneity
distribution.7
7To estimate the parameters we maximize the simulated likelihood using 1,000 modified latin hypercube sampling
draws proposed by Hess, Train, and Polak (2006) and a quasi-Newton method with analytical gradients provided in




Table 2 reports the means and standard deviations of Θ̂j . The means of the noise parameters for
patient type (σξj ) and clinical diagnostic information (σηj ) are large, 6.38 and 2.18. Interestingly,
mean σξj is markedly larger than σηj , meaning that physicians rely more on clinical diagnostic
information than on information obtained from observing patient types. This result suggests that
providing patient type information in the form of machine learning predicted risk should improve
physicians’ ability to predict the bacterial cause of infections. The extent to which patient type and
clinical diagnostic information is used in decisions varies significantly between clinics, as reflected
in the standard deviations of the estimates of σξj and σηj . The mean value of 0.56 of the preference
parameter estimates, bounded by 0 and 1 by the assumption that 0 < βj < αj , suggests conservative
physicians on average. The mean physician weighs the social cost of increasing antibiotic resistance
due to one antibiotic prescription slightly above one half the health benefit of curing one patient. The
standard deviation of 0.13 reflects substantial heterogeneity in how physicians solve this trade-off.
Table 2 Distribution of parameter estimates
Mean (SD)
Type signal noise, σξj 6.38 (3.59)
Diagnostic signal noise, σηj 2.18 (1.40)
Payoff function parameter, βj 0.56 (0.13)
Notes: This table reports the means and standard deviations of
the distribution of parameter estimates over 194 physician clinics.
The model is estimated separately for each clinic.
Figures 7 to 9 in Appendix E show the distributions of parameter estimates. For anonymization
we show heatmaps and do not report values in areas containing less than five clinics. The distribu-
tion of the clinical diagnostic skill parameter σηj is concentrated in the area between 1 and 3. The
noise parameter σξj measuring the extent to which physicians make use of patient type information
is more dispersed between 1 and 7. The more pronounced concentration of σηj estimates suggests
that the majority of physicians makes use of clinical diagnostic information even if significant het-
erogeneity remains. The large estimate of σξj on average suggests that providing machine learning
predictions can improve physician information significantly. In particular, we find a relevant number
of physicians with very large σξj estimates. In Figure 7, physicians with estimated σξj > 6 account
for 40% of all physicians. This group does not appear to use patient type information encoded in
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observable data. Therefore, combining systematic information in predictions m(xi) with valuable
clinical diagnostic information used by these physicians may substantially improve decisions. Fig-
ures 8 and 9 do not show a systematic relationship between the estimated payoff weights and both
noise parameters. Figures 10 to 12 in Appendix F show the 95% confidence intervals for physician-
level parameter estimates, computed by bootstrapping at the physician-level. Sorting the estimates
by their value, we see that the variance of skill parameter estimates increases in the size of the
estimates. The estimates of σηj have tight confidence intervals at lower values and throughout from
below. In simulations illustrated in Figure 13 in Appendix G we show for relevant parameter ranges
that, with increasing size of σξ, variation in the parameter has a vanishingly small effect on physi-
cian decisions. This also explains the observation that the lower bound of the confidence intervals
follows the parameter estimates more tightly than the upper bound. The confidence intervals for
payoff function parameter estimates is uniform over the full range.
We also investigate how well the model fits the data. Figure 14 in Appendix H shows the distri-
butions of the observed mean, over-, and underprescribing rates and their simulated counterparts
based on the parameter estimates. The simulated distributions closely resemble the observed data.
5.4 Observed heterogeneity
To investigate potential sources of heterogeneity across primary care clinics, we correlate parameter
estimates with observable clinic characteristics. We aggregate individual physician characteristics to
the primary care clinic level because prescriptions are observed for clinics. Due to data limitations we
are able to merge characteristics for a subset of 117 out of the total of 194 clinics. Linear regression
results of the parameters estimates on clinic characteristics in Table 3 show several interesting
patterns. For the estimate of noise in physicians’ use of information encoded in observables xi,
σ̂ξj , all confidence intervals of covariate coefficients cover the zero. Inspecting the coefficients, less
noise is associated with female physicians and higher propensity to request laboratory diagnostic
for urine sample, which may reflect more extensive experience treating patients with urinary tract
infection. Primary care clinics with more physicians are associated with lower noise estimates. The
noise parameter for clinical diagnostic information, σ̂ηj , is negatively correlated with the number of
laboratory tests a clinic requested per patient. The confidence interval on this correlation excludes
the zero. Clinics with higher test intensity may have higher skill in deciding to do additional clinical
tests or the ability to better extract information from test diagnostics. Noise in clinical diagnostic
information is positively associated with the mean age of physicians in a clinic, with the confidence
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Table 3 Parameter estimates and physician characteristics
Linear regression
Type signal noise Clinical signal noise Preferences
N = 117 σ̂ξj σ̂ηj β̂j
Patients per physician 0.02 [-1.67, 1.72] -0.28 [-0.66, 0.11] 0.02 [-0.05, 0.09]
Laboratory tests per patient -0.67 [-1.90, 0.55] -0.52 [-0.94, -0.11] -0.02 [-0.06, 0.03]
Mean number of physicians -0.44 [-1.86, 0.98] 0.07 [-0.31, 0.45] -0.03 [-0.08, 0.03]
Mean age of physicians -0.03 [-4.09, 4.02] 2.30 [ 0.50, 4.10] 0.09 [-0.08, 0.27]
Share of female physicians -0.15 [-1.03, 0.72] -0.001 [-0.31, 0.31] 0.003 [-0.03, 0.04]
R2 0.02 0.12 0.03
Notes: This table presents coefficients for three linear regressions where the outcomes are the three parameter
estimates of the physician choice model summarized in Table 2 and the correlates are clinic-level physician charac-
teristics. Mean values are used for multi-physician clinics. Heteroskedasticity-robust 95% confidence intervals are
reported in brackets.
interval excluding the zero. Several narratives would support this correlation. For example, older
physicians might rely more on their clinical experience and personal knowledge of recurring patients
than on costly diagnostic tests. Alternatively, they may be less likely to purchase new diagnostic
equipment and rely on existing tools they are accustomed to. The results for preference parameter
estimates, β̂j , are more difficult to interpret because only the ratio between weights βj and αj is
identified. Clinics with on average older physicians seem to have larger weights on the antibiotic
resistance externality relative to the weight on alleviating patients’ sickness cost, while this ratio is
negatively associated with the number of laboratory tests per patient and clinic size measured as
the number of physicians.
6 Counterfactual policy evaluation
We evaluate counterfactual policies by comparing their induced decision outcomes δ with the ob-
served physician prescriptions δ0. Changes in overall prescribing are defined as ∆δ, changes in over-
prescribing, i.e. antibiotic prescriptions given to patients without a bacterial infection, as ∆δ¬y,
and changes in the number of correctly treated bacterial UTI patients as ∆δy.
Table 4 shows policy outcomes for three counterfactual interventions.8 The first counterfactual
8We report nearly identical results in Table 6 in Appendix I for the subset of clinics for which we cannot reject
that the machine learning predictions are unbiased. For these, selection on unobservables into testing is least likely.
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Table 4 Counterfactual policy outcomes
1. Provide ML-based τi 2. Manipulate payoffs 3. Redistribution
Set σξj = 0 β′j = min(βj + κ, 1) ∆δy
!
= 0
Overall prescribing, ∆δ in percent -25.4 [-26.1, -23.1] -25.4 [-26.4, -24.5] -10.0 [-11.4, -9.5]
Nδ = 16, 334
Treated bacterial cases, ∆δy in percent -13.1 [-14.6, -10.6] -20.4 [-22.2, -18.7] 0 [0, 0]
Nδy = 9, 957
Overprescribing, ∆δ¬y in percent -44.5 [-45.3, -41.3] -33.1 [-35.0, -31.4] -25.2 [-28.8, -24.6]
Nδ¬y = 6, 377
Change in payoffs, Wj(δj) in percent 20.1 5.8 12.1
Notes: This table reports changes to the status quo in percent across 194 clinics. The observed absolute numbers are
reported in the left column. In counterfactual two, we set κ = 0.12 to obtain the same ∆δ as in counterfactual one.
provides physicians with the machine learning prediction of type τi for every patient and assumes
that physicians use it without noise by setting σξj = 0. In this counterfactual, clinical diagnostic skill
and the payoff function parameter are held fixed. We find that overall prescribing decreases by 25.4
percent (4,140 prescriptions) and overprescribing decreases by 44.5 percent (2,839 prescriptions).
Interestingly, the number of treated bacterial infections is also reduced by 13.1 percent (1,302
prescriptions). Hence, the improved and more precise information on patient type shows how
conservative physicians are on average. In the context of antibiotic prescribing in primary care
overprescribing is the foremost concern because effects of antibiotic treatment cannot be reversed
while decisions to delay prescribing can be corrected as soon as complete test results are available.
In counterfactual two, we manipulate the physicians’ payoff functions but keep physician skill
regarding patient type and clinical diagnostics unchanged. In particular, we increase the payoff
parameter betaj by a constant κ such that the overall reduction in prescribing is equivalent to
the counterfactual reduction achieved by providing the machine learning predictions to physicians.
More precisely, we define the counterfactual payoff parameter as β′j = min(βj + κ, 1), where setting
κ = 0.12 attains the overall reduction in prescribing of 25.4 percent. Such an intervention can
be interpreted as a nudge or an antibiotic tax that shifts the relative weights on the social cost
of increasing antibiotic resistance and an individual patients’ sickness cost of foregone antibiotic
treatment. Although overall reduction in prescribing is the same as in counterfactual one, overpre-
scribing is reduced significantly less by 33.1 percent (2,110 prescriptions), compared to 44.5 percent
in the first counterfactual. Notably, manipulating the payoff function weights without improving
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diagnostic information induces adverse effects as reflected in a large decrease in treated bacterial
infections by 20.4 percent (2,207 prescriptions).
These results illustrate the usefulness of separating the prediction and decision step in the
structural model. The effects of interventions attempting to incentivize behavior according to social
objectives can be considered independently from interventions aimed at purely improving diagnostic
information. This is in contrast to situations studied by Cowgill and Stevenson (2020) in which
algorithm outputs are manipulated to communicate not only predictions but also social objectives.
They argue that such manipulations can lead to refusal by human experts to use predictions. The
framework we consider allows for interventions in which the two aims, providing machine learning
predictions to experts and incentivizing social behavior, can be implemented and evaluated as
complements.
In counterfactual three, we evaluate a prescription rule that corresponds to the procedure used
in the prior literature evaluating machine learning predictions (Bayati et al. 2014; Chalfin et al.
2016; Kleinberg et al. 2018; Ribers and Ullrich 2019; Yelin et al. 2019; Hastings, Howison, and
Inman 2020). The rule relies on the assumption that human discretion can be overruled or that
decision makers adhere perfectly to prediction-based prescription rules. In this policy, prescriptions
for patients with low predicted risk are delayed until test results are available. All patients with
high predicted risk receive prescriptions before test results arrive. As the payoff function parameter
βj is typically unknown in this stream of literature, it is convenient to focus on a corner solution
that maximally reduces antibiotic use while enforcing ∆δy = 0. This guarantees a welfare increase
to a social planner for all βS ∈ [0, 1]. This counterfactual policy reduces overall prescribing by 10.0
percent (1,634 prescriptions) and overprescribing by 25.2 percent (1,607 prescriptions) while, by
construction, the change in the number of prescriptions to bacterial infections is zero. We note the
significant differences compared to the outcomes of counterfactual one where physicians incorporate
patient type information provided by the machine learning predictions.






where Π̄j = −β̂j
∑
i∈Ij yi is the first best outcome realized if and only if the physician gives pre-
scriptions to patients with a bacterial infection and Πj(δj) =
∑
i∈Ij π(dij , yi ; β̂j) is the physician’s
payoff for the set of decisions dij ∈ δj . Payoff gains are largest for the counterfactual policy which
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provides patient type information and smallest for the policy manipulating payoff weights on the
antibiotic resistance externality. This result is expected because increasing the weight on the cost
of prescribing resembles a tax reducing utility. The gains from the redistribution policy, which con-
strains physician discretion, lie in between. The results based on counterfactual policies one and two
provide a more realistic ex ante evaluation of the potential gains due to machine learning predictions
because they do not rely on the assumption that physicians adhere perfectly to a prediction-based
decision rule. Complete replacement of human decision makers is often not desirable or realistic,
making it difficult to draw conclusions from results relying on such an assumption. The differences
in payoff gains reflect that implementation of a redistribution policy may conflict with physician
and patient preferences.
Finally, taking the perspective of a social planner, we evaluate welfare effects to provide a ranking
of counterfactual policies based not only on reported counts of outcomes but on gains in payoffs
given social preferences. We calculate the welfare effects for the three counterfactual policies over
the continuum of potential social planner preference parameter values βS ∈ [0, 1] as




where Π̄ = −βS
∑
i∈I yi is the first best aggregate outcome over the full set of patients, I, re-
alized if and only if prescriptions are given to patients with a bacterial infection and Π(δ, βS) =∑
i∈I π(dij(i), yi ; β
S) is the aggregated payoff function for the set of decisions dij(i) ∈ δ.
Figure 5 shows W (δ, βS) over the full support of βS , revealing that the best policy depends on
the social planner’s weight on the antibiotic resistance externality. The third counterfactual is based
on the constraint that prescribing to bacterial infections cannot be reduced, which guarantees that
positive payoff gains are always achieved. This is particularly important if preferences are unknown.
However, with known preferences, the counterfactuals which give physicians full discretion and make
use of their expertise dominate the corner solution. This is intuitive because, if society places a
sufficiently large weight on the externality, then it is worthwhile even to reduce prescriptions to
some bacterial infections in exchange for a reduction of overprescribing. The preference parameter
above which counterfactuals one and two achieve higher gains than counterfactual three, lies just
below the mean estimated physician-level βj of 0.56. Therefore, if the social planner’s weight βS is
at least as large as the average physician’s βj , providing better diagnostic information to physicians
yields the highest social benefits.
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Figure 5: Counterfactual welfare effects for social planner preferences βS ∈ [0, 1].
7 Conclusion
We show how policies enabled by machine learning predictions can be evaluated when humans hold
decision-relevant information. It is typically difficult to determine whether such information is com-
plementary to or can be substituted by machine learning predictions. If such information, or the
skill required to obtain it, is difficult to measure and varying across decision makers, assessing the
added value of machine learning predictions ex ante is challenging. Field trials may be designed to
provide reliable assessments but are often difficult to implement for ethical, legal, or practical rea-
sons. It is therefore important to develop model-based tools to evaluate potential implementations
ex ante. Promising evaluations may help convince stake holders that field trials are worthwhile to
implement.
The setting we consider for this analysis, antibiotic prescribing for suspected urinary tract in-
fections, resembles many situations in primary care provision but also expert decision problems
more generally. While we consider and exploit some idiosyncrasies of the primary care setting,
our analysis provides a more generally applicable framework for the evaluation of machine learning
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in data-rich environments. Whether and how our analysis can be helpful in alternative settings
depends on measurement of the target outcome and on the availability of data to allow unbiased
predictions at the level of decision makers. We provide evidence supporting the assumption that,
combined with the ability to observe the full set of outcomes, observable patient information is suf-
ficiently rich to identify skill and payoffs in our setting. Unbiasedness may not only be threatened
by insufficient prediction quality but also by potential selection problems when decisions impact
measured outcomes. In such settings, alternative identification strategies, for example based on
random assignment assumptions as proposed by Kleinberg et al. (2018) and Chan, Gentzkow, and
Yu (2020), are necessary in addition to quality machine learning predictions.
Several important avenues for further research specific to the context of antibiotic prescribing
remain. It would be worthwhile to attempt encoding further clinical information, for example,
from electronic health records, such as reported symptoms and results from in-clinic diagnostics to
further improve machine learning predictions. We also omit an important dimension of antibiotic
prescribing, the choice of molecule. It remains an open question for future research to what ex-
tent prediction of bacterial species and molecule-specific resistances can further inform prescription
choice. Further research is needed to better understand experts’ potential behavioral reactions to
the introduction of prediction tools. Results from such studies may provide insights on how to op-
timally communicate machine learning predictions, to what extent to explain prediction outcomes,
and potential effects on decision makers’ incentives to acquire information and expertise.
While we consider one specific type of medical diagnostic and treatment problem, our results
indicate the potential of using machine learning predictions in many relevant health care situa-
tions. Data availability and the quality of prediction algorithms are improving at a rapid pace in
and beyond health care. The rate at which such technologies will be more broadly adopted and
productively exploited, however, will depend on the kind and quality of human expertise it can com-
plement. If our findings are suggestive more generally, human experts are far from being replaced.




Appendix A Physician heterogeneity
Table 5 Physician decisions as predictors and clinic characteristics
Outcome: ∆ AUC from including linear regression coefficients
treatment decisions as predictor
Number of clinic’s unique patients per physician 0.007 [-0.015, 0.028]
Number of laboratory results per unique patient 0.007 [-0.005, 0.018]
Mean number of physicians -0.002 [-0.017, 0.014]
Mean age of physicians -0.023 [-0.074, 0.027]
Share of female physicians 0.007 [-0.002, 0.015]
R2 0.05
Observations 117
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust 95% confidence intervals in brackets.
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Figure 6: The distribution of νi and the signals ξij and ηij for an example patient,
who has a bacterial infection (νi > ν̄).
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Appendix C Simulated choice probabilities
Simulation procedure for patient i and physician j (index i and j suppressed below):
1. Given m(x) and y, draw simulated sickness realizations
νr ∼ N (m(x), 1 | y = 1[νr>ν̄]).
and signals
ξr ∼ N (m(x), σ2ξ )
ηr ∼ N (νr, σ2η)
for physician parameters σξ and ση.
2. Compute the expected payoff:









if d = 0
−β if d = 1
where α and β are physician parameters and µr and σr are functions of ξr, ηr, σξ, ση and ση
as stated in equation 6. Note that either α or β must be normalized. We set α = 1.















yields step-functions of σξ, ση and β, which are difficult to minimize numerically in maximum
likelihood estimation. Therefore, we compute choice probabilities using the Logit-smoothed






































4. Repeat steps 1-3 R times, so that r takes the values 1 through R.


















Appendix D Analytical gradients
The objective function can be written
LLH(σξj , σηj , βj | ξij , ηij , dij) =
∑
i∈Ij













































































































































































































































Figure 7: Heatmap of physician-level estimates for σξ and ση. To ensure anonymity,














































Figure 8: Heatmap of physician-level estimates for b and ση. To ensure anonymity,



































Figure 9: Heatmap of physician-level estimates for b and σξ. To ensure anonymity,
the figure shows a heatmap covering only areas of five physicians or more.
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Figure 10: Physician-level estimates and bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for














Figure 11: Physician-level estimates and bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for













Figure 12: Physician-level estimates and bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for β.
To ensure anonymity, the figure is LOWESS-smoothed with bandwidth 0.2.
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Appendix G Simulation of the decision-relevance of σξ




























Figure 13: Simulated changes in choice due to changes in σξ, in percent per step size
one.
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Figure 14: Observed and simulated moments
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Appendix I Counterfactuals for reduced sample
Table 6 Counterfactual policy outcomes, sample of physicians where unbiased prediction cannot
be rejected
1. Provide ML-based τi 2. Manipulate payoffs 3. Redistribution
Set σξj = 0 β′j = min(βj + κ, 1) ∆δy
!
= 0
Overall prescribing, ∆δ in percent -25.5 [-26.3, -22.6] -25.5 [-26.2, -24.2] -9.92 [-11.2, -9.4]
Nδ = 13, 484
Treated bacterial cases, ∆δy in percent -13.4 [-14.7, -10.5] -20.6 [-21.9, -18.7] 0 [0, 0]
Nδy = 8, 199
Overprescribing, ∆δ¬y in percent -44.2 [-45.3, -40.4] -33.0 [-34.3, -30.5] -24.9 [-28.6, -24.2]
Nδ¬y = 5, 285
Change in payoffs, Wj(δj) in percent 19.0 4.4 12.3
Notes: This table reports changes to the status quo in percent across 160 clinics. The observed absolute numbers are
reported in the left column. In counterfactual two, we set κ = 0.12 to obtain the same ∆δ as in counterfactual one.
39
References
[1] Abaluck, Jason, Leila Agha, Chris Kabrhel, Ali Raja, and Arjun Venkatesh (2016), “The de-
terminants of productivity in medical testing: Intensity and allocation of care,” American
Economic Review, 106 (12), 3730-3764.
[2] Agrawal, Ajay, Joshua Gans, and Avi Goldfarb (2018), Prediction Machines: The Simple Eco-
nomics of Artificial Intelligence, Harvard Business Press.
[3] Andini, Monica, Emanuele Ciania, Guido de Blasio, Alessio D’Ignazio, and Viola Salvestrini
(2018), “Targeting with machine learning: An application to a tax rebate program in Italy,”
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 156, 86-102.
[4] Athey, Susan (2018), “The impact of machine learning on economics,” in The Economics of
Artificial Intelligence: An Agenda ed. Ajay K. Agrawal, Joshua Gans, and Avi Goldfarb, Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
[5] Bayati, Mohsen, Mark Braverman, Michael Gillam, Karen M. Mack, George Ruiz, Mark S.
Smith, and Eric Horvitz (2014), “Data-driven decisions for reducing readmissions for heart
failure: general methodology and case study,” PLoS ONE, 9 (10), e109264.
[6] Bennett, Daniel, Che-Lun Hung, and Tsai-Ling Lauderdale (2015), “Health care competition
and antibiotic use in Taiwan,” The Journal of Industrial Economics, 63 (2), 371-393.
[7] Cassidy, Rachel, and Charles F. Manski (2019), “Tuberculosis diagnosis and treatment under
uncertainty,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116 (46), 22990-22997.
[8] CDC (2013), Antibiotic resistance threats in the United States, https://www.cdc.gov/
drugresistance/threat-report-2013/pdf/ar-threats-2013-508.pdf, accessed 4/2/2019.
[9] Chalfin, Aaron, Oren Danieli, Andrew Hillis, Zubin Jelveh, Michael Luca, Jens Ludwig, and
Sendhil Mullainathan (2016), “Productivity and selection of human capital with machine learn-
ing,” American Economic Review, 106 (5), 124-127.
[10] Chan, David C., Matthew Gentzkow, and Chuan Yu (2019), Selection with variation in diag-
nostic skill: evidence from radiologists, NBER Working Paper No. 26467.
[11] Cowgill, Bo, and Megan T. Stevenson (2020), “Algorithmic social engineering,” AEA Papers &
Proceedings, 110.
40
[12] Currie, Janet, Wanchuan Lin, and Juanjuan Meng (2014), “Addressing antibiotic abuse in
China: an experimental audit study,” Journal of Development Economics, 110, 39-51.
[13] Currie, Janet and W. Bentley MacLeod (2017), “Diagnosing expertise: human capital, decision
making, and performance among physicians,” Journal of Labor Economics, 35 (1), 1-43.
[14] Davenport, Michael, Kathleen E. Mach, Linda M. Dairiki Shortliffe, Niaz Banaei, Tza-Huei
Wang, and Joseph C. Liao (2017), “New and developing diagnostic technologies for urinary
tract infections,” Nature Reviews Urology, 14 (5), 296.
[15] Danish Health and Medicines Authority (2013), Guidelines on prescribing antibiotics for physi-
cians and others in Denmark, November 2013, Copenhagen.
[16] Danish Ministry of Health (2017), National handlingsplan for antibiotika til mennesker. Tre
målbare mål for en reduktion af antibiotikaforbruget frem mod 2020.
[17] Das, Jishnu, Alaka Holla, Aakash Mohpal, and Karthik Muralidharan (2016), “Quality and ac-
countability in health care delivery: audit-study evidence from primary care in India,” American
Economic Review, 106 (12), 3765-3799.
[18] Flores-Mireles, Ana L., Jennifer N. Walker, Michael Caparon, and Scott J. Hultgren (2015),
“Urinary tract infections: epidemiology, mechanisms of infection and treatment options,” Nature
Reviews Microbiology, 13, 269-284.
[19] Foxman, Betsy (2002), “Epidemiology of urinary tract infections: incidence, morbidity, and
economic costs,” The American Journal of Medicine, 113 (1), Suppl. 1, 5-13.
[20] Friedman, Jerome H., Trevor Hastie, and Robert Tibshirani (2000), “Additive logistic regres-
sion: a statistical view of boosting (with discussion and a rejoinder by the authors),” Annals
of Statistics, 28 (2), 337-407.
[21] Friedman, Jerome H. (2001), “Greedy function approximation: a gradient boosting machine,”
Annals of Statistics, 29 (5), 1189-1232.
[22] Hallsworth, Michael, Tim Chadborn, Anna Sallis, Michael Sanders, Daniel Berry, Felix Greaves,
Lara Clements, and Sally C. Davies (2016), “Provision of social norm feedback to high pre-
scribers of antibiotics in general practice: a pragmatic national randomised controlled trial,”
The Lancet, 387 (10029), 1743-1752.
41
[23] Hastie, Trevor, Robert Tibshirani, and Jerome Friedman (2009), The Elements of statistical
learning: data mining, inference, and prediction, 2nd Edition, New York: Springer.
[24] Hastings, J.S., M. Howison, S.E. Inman (2020), “Predicting high-risk opioid prescriptions before
they are given,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(4), 1917-23.
[25] Hess, Stephane, Kenneth E. Train, and John W. Polak (2006), “On the use of a Modified Latin
Hypercube Sampling (MLHS) method in the estimation of a Mixed Logit Model for vehicle
choice,” Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 40 (2), 147-163.
[26] Hoffrage, Ulrich, Samuel Lindsey, Ralph Hertwig, and Gerd Gigerenzer (2000), “Communicating
statistical information,” Science, 290 (5500), 2261-2262.
[27] Kang, Jun Seok, Polina Kuznetsova, Michael Luca, and Yejin Choi (2013), “Where not to eat?
Improving public policy by predicting hygiene inspections using online reviews,” in Proceedings
of the 2013 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing, 1443-1448.
[28] Kleinberg, Jon, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Ziad Obermeyer (2015), “Prediction
policy problems,” American Economic Review, 105 (5), 491-495.
[29] Kleinberg, Jon, Himabindu Lakkaraju, Jure Leskovec, Jens Ludwig, and Sendhil Mullainathan
(2018), “Human decisions and machine predictions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 133 (1),
237-293.
[30] Kwon, Illoong and Daesung Jun (2015), “Information disclosure and peer effects in the use of
antibiotics,” Journal of Health Economics, 42, 1-16.
[31] Laxminarayan, Ramanan, Adriano Duse, Chand Wattal, Anita K.M. Zaidi, Heiman F.L.
Wertheim, Nithima Sumpradit, Erika Vlieghe, Gabriel Levy Hara, Ian M. Gould, Herman
Goossens, Christina Greko, Anthony D. So, Maryam Bigdeli, Göran Tomson, Will Woodhouse,
Eva Ombaka, Arturo Quizhpe Peralta, Farah Naz Qamar, Fatima Mir, Sam Kariuki, Zul-
fiqar A. Bhutta, Anthony Coates, Richard Bergstrom, Gerard D. Wright, Eric D. Brown, and
Otto Cars (2013), “Antibiotic resistance – the need for global solutions,” The Lancet Infectious
Diseases Commission, 1-42.
[32] Llor, Carl and Lars Bjerrum (2014), “Antimicrobial resistance: risk associated with antibiotic
overuse and initiatives to reduce the problem,” Therapeutic Advances in Drug Safety, 5 (6),
229-241.
42
[33] Mullainathan, Sendhil and Ziad Obermeyer (2019), A machine learning approach to low-value
health care: wasted tests, missed heart attacks and mis-predictions, NBER Working Paper No.
26168.
[34] Pallin, Daniel J., Clare Ronan, Kamaneh Montazeri, Katherine Wai, Allen Gold, Siddharth
Parmar, and Jeremiah D. Schuur (2014), “Urinalysis in acute care of adults: pitfalls in testing
and interpreting results,” Open Forum Infectious Diseases, 1 (1), ofu019.
[35] Møller Pedersen, Kjeld, John Sahl Andersen, and Jens Søndergaard (2012), “General practice
and primary health care in Denmark,” Journal of the American Board of Family Medicine, 25
(Suppl 1), S34-S38.
[36] Ribers, Michael and Hannes Ullrich (2019), “Battling antibiotic resistance: can machine learn-
ing improve prescribing?,” DIW Discussion Paper Nr. 1803.
[37] Ribers, Michael and Hannes Ullrich (2020), “Battling antibiotic resistance: can machine learn-
ing improve prescribing?,” mimeo.
[38] World Health Organization (2014), Antimicrobial Resistance: Global Report on Surveillance,
Geneva, Switzerland.
[39] Yelin, I., O. Snitser, G. Novich, R. Katz, O. Tal, M. Parizade, G. Chodick, G. Koren, V. Shalev,
and R. Kishony (2019), “Personal clinical history predicts antibiotic resistance of urinary tract
infections,” Nature Medicine, 25(7), 1143-1152.
43
